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Is there room in the literature for yet another book about legal
writing skills?' If the widespread dissatisfaction with lawyers' writing
is an accurate indication, the answer is undoubtedly "yes."
Criticism of legal writing has come with increasing frequency and
stridency in recent years from lawyers and nonlawyers alike. Judges
have criticized the writing of advocates, 2 and lawyers have complained
about the writing of judges3 and other lawyers.4 Law professors have
bemoaned both their students' inability to write the King's English 5
* Associate, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Adjunct Instructor of Law,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University (1978-1980). B.A. 1971, New York
University; J.D. 1975, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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York Law School (1979-1981). B.A. 1973, Wesleyan University; J.D. 1976, Columbia University.
1. Many books treat various aspects of legal writing. See, e.g., ADVOCACY AND THE KING'S
ENGLISH (G. Rossman ed. 1960); E. BISKIND, SIMPLIFY LEGAL WRITING (2d ed. 1975); G. BLOCK,
EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING (1981); N. BRAND & J. WHITE, LEGAL WRITING (1976); F. COOPER,
WRITING IN LAW PRACTICE (2d ed. 1963); R. FLESCH, HOW TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH (1979); M.
FREEMAN, THE GRAMMATICAL LAWYER (1979); M. PITTONI, BRIEF WRITING AND ARGUMENTA-
TION (3d ed. 1967); E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT (4th ed. 1974); M. ROMBAUER,
LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING (3d ed. 1978); W. STATSKY & R. WERNEr, CASE ANALYSIS AND FUN-
DAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING (1977); H. WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE (2d ed. 1980); F.
WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1967); R. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR
LAWYERS (1979).
2. See, e.g., Slater v. Gallman, 38 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 339 N.E.2d 863, 864, 377 N.Y.S.2d 448, 450
(1975) ("[U]nfortunately it is not always the rare case in which we receive poorly written and
excessively long briefs, replete with burdensome, irrelevant, and immaterial matter").
3. See, e.g., Stevenson, Writing Effective Opinions, 59 JUD. 134 (1975), in which the author
summarizes a feeling long expressed by lawyers, that many judicial opinions are "too long, ...
filled with unnecessary detail, . . .overloaded with footnotes .... couched in jargon unclear to
many of their readers, [and] ... poorly arranged and carelessly worded." Id. at 134.
4. A senior partner in a prominent Wall Street law firm recently wrote, for example, that
many legal memoranda are "mystery stories" which require that "a great deal of time and effort
... be spent reading and rereading them to discover the ideas meant to be conveyed." Clare,
Teaching Clear Legal Writing-The Practitioner's Viewpoint, 52 N.Y. St. B.J. 192 (April 1980).
5. William L. Prosser, for one, bitterly complained that many of his students displayed an
"appalling lack of ability to organize a paragraph or even a sentence, to say simply and clearly
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and their own tendency to write "unintelligible gibberish."' 6 And all
law school graduates have been pilloried by a general public that has
grown increasingly resentful of the unnecessary complexity of
"legalese."7
George D. Gopen, Assistant Professor of English and Director of
Writing Programs at Loyola University of Chicago, has responded to
the tidal wave of criticism with a textbook entitled Writing From a Le-
gal Perspective.8 The book is about the art of composition and is for
law students and undergraduates planning on careers in law.9
I. A LAWYER'S LANGUAGE
Professor Gopen begins chapter one with two fundamental prem-
ises that lawyers, as well as aspiring lawyers, should ponder before put-
ting pen to paper. He tells the reader that "[a]side from the redefinition
of certain vocabulary for technical use, lawyers have no needs for lan-
guage that are unique to their profession."10 We agree. The language
of the law is English. The characteristics of good writing are the same
for lawyers as for anyone else.11
what is meant." Prosser, English As She Is Wrote, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 158 (1954), revising,
Prosser, English As She Is Wrote, 28 ENG. J. 38 (1939).
6. See, eg., Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279, 287-88 (1962)
("Without a style that conceals all content and mangles all meaning, or lack of same, beneath
impressive-sounding but unintelligible gibberish, most of the junk that reaches print in the law
reviews and such scholarly journals could never get itself published anywhere-not even there").
7. See, eg., Gerhart, Improving Our Legal Writing: Maximfrom the Masters, 40 A.B.A.J.
1057, 1057 (1954) ("Lawyers' language has long been regarded as the prime example of complex,
unreadable, often unintelligible English. Such phrases as legal technicality', 'fine print', 'lawyers'
Mumbo-Jumbo', etc. should be a warning to legal writers. Maury Maverick summed it up in a
new word he coined himself--'gobbledygook!' ").
8. G. GOPEN, WrrNG FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1981). The book had its genesis in
1975 at the University of Utah, where the author created an advanced composition course for pre-
law students. Id. at vii. Many of the ideas and exercises contained in the book were first set out in
Gopen, A Composition Course for Pre-Law Students, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1978). See also
Gopen, A Question of Cash and Credit: Writing Programs at the Law Schools, 3 J. CONTEMP. L.
191 (1977).
9. This dual focus is particularly timely because, beginning in the summer of 1982, the Law
School Admission Test is expected to include an unscored writing sample. LAW SCHOOL ADMIS-
SION BuLL. 1 (Dec. 1980).
10. G. GOPEN, supra note 8, at 5.
11. See Wishingrad & Abrams, Book Review, 184 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1980, at 2 (reviewing R.
WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAwYERS (1979)). Many commentators share our view. See, e.g.,
F. RODELL, WOE UNTo You, LAwYERS! 12 (Berkley Books ed. 1980) ("[D]espite what the lawyers
say, it is possible to talk about legal principles and legal reasoning in everyday non-legal lan-
guage") (emphasis in original); Bordwell, 4 Writing Specialist in the Law School, 17 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 462 (1965) ("[L]inguistically and rhetorically speaking, legal writing on any level is simply
a matter of embedding extraordinary legal words and phrases in ordinary English syntax and
vocabulary"); Kirp, The Writer as Lawyer as Writer. . . . , 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115 (1969) ("At its
best, writing by lawyers and judges and legislators... differs from garden variety expository
1062 [Vol. 1981:1061
BOOK REVIEW
Lest the reader think that there is nothing unique about "writing
from a legal perspective," Professor Gopen quickly points out that legal
writing does differ from most other writing in at least one fundamental
respect. "Writing clear and precise prose is a most difficult task even
under ideal conditions," he tells us, "but the lawyer faces the worst of
all conditions, a hostile audience," one that "will do its best to find the
weaknesses in the prose, even perhaps to find ways of turning the words
against their intended meaning."' 12
The "hostile" reader is certainly well-known to the legal writer. A
party seeking to evade contractual obligations searches for any loop-
hole. Judges and law clerks parse a brief to test whether its arguments
can withstand attack, but only after opposing counsel has scrutinized
them to see whether they can be made to mean precisely what the
writer did not intend. Even judicial writing is not immune--consider
the energy that advocates expend distinguishing, and at times even dis-
torting, a troublesome precedent.
What this hostility means, Professor Gopen says, is that legal writ-
ers have a "special combination" of needs, which he lists in chapter one
and elaborates on in subsequent chapters: (1) the need for precision
and "anti-precision"; (2) the need to articulate the steps and connec-
tions in a logical argument; (3) the need to recognize that persons with
varying viewpoints and interests may differ in their responses to words
and arguments (a version of the familiar maxim, "Know your reader");
and (4) the need to maintain clarity of expression despite complexity of
thought. 13
II. LANGUAGE AND PRECISION
To write with precision, one must be aware of the dynamics of the
English language. Chapter three reminds the reader that language
evolves over time: old words acquire new meanings or fade into disuse,
and new words as well as foreign words enter the language. To make
this indisputable point, however, the chapter consumes about thirty
prose only in subject matter"). But see Aiken, Let'r Not Oversimplify Legal Language, 32 ROCKY
MTN. L. REv. 358, 364 (1960) ("To communicate upon matters of technicality and complexity...
is impossible with (and for) the nontechnical and simple person; and to use the language of sim-
plicity in addressing a learned profession is to insult that profession").
12. G. GoPEN, supra note 8, at 1. Shortly after publication of the first edition of his Legal
Writing Style, Professor Henry Weihofen made the same observation:
Because the lawyer can never know when something he has written will be set upon by
opponents who want to twist its meaning to their own ends, he must be more careful than
most writers to make sure that his words say precisely what he means, no more and no
less.
Weihofen, Word- Watchingfor Lawyers, 50 A.B.A.J. 663 (1964).
13. G. GOPEN, supra note 8, at 6-7.
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pages and includes, among other curiosities, 14 nearly six pages of dic-
tionary definitions and etymologies of such words as "nicotine" and
"poinsettia."' 5 Although the reader learns, for example, that "nico-
tine" was named after Jean Nicot, France's ambassador to Portugal
who introduced tobacco to the French in 1560, and that the "poinset-
tia" was named after Joel Roberts Poinsett (1779-1851), an American
minister to Mexico who discovered the plant, we question the useful-
ness of page after page of these admittedly interesting trifles. Then, to
make matters worse, chapter four contains more than thirty pages stat-
ing and restating the self-evident proposition that although words are
the only tools we have to convey meaning in writing, they are
imprecise.16
III. THE CLASSIC FORMS OF LEGAL WRITING
In chapter five, Professor Gopen departs from his general treat-
ment of composition to provide some advice concerning the classic
forms of legal writing-agreements, appellate briefs, and memo-
randa-which are the focus of first-year programs and of upper-class
seminars on drafting in American law schools.' 7
In his excellent discussion of agreements, Professor Gopen points
out the problem, sometimes overlooked in drafting seminars, resulting
from the lawyer's inability to predict every contingency that may arise
after an agreement is signed. Because of this problem, a lawyer must
make calculated use of imprecise language when drafting an agreement
intended to leave as little as possible open to question, a technique Pro-
fessor Gopen calls "anti-precision."' 8 Anti-precision does not call for
purposeful creation of ambiguity that might thwart the parties' intent
14. Chapter III concludes with this exercise:
Comment as thoroughly as possible on the effects of the following word choices.
(6) A restaurant tries to decide what sign to put on the doors of the rooms
that contain toilets and sinks for the use of patrons. What are the
messages communicated by each of the following possibilities, and what
would the restaurant be saying about itself in each case?
(a) Gentlemen/Ladies
(b) Men/Women
(c) Rest room
(d) Bathroom
(e) Toilet
(f) The Loo
(g) w.c.
(h) The Head
(i) Powder Room
Id. 73.
15. Id. 58.
16. Id. 74-108.
17. Id. 109-25.
18. Id. 122-25.
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or lead to litigation. Rather, it calls for a clear statement of the parties'
intentions and precise definition of their respective obligations, with
sufficient allowance for unforeseeable situations. 19
Professor Gopen's short discussion of brief writing makes one per-
spicacious point: because the statement of facts must be purely narra-
tive, scrupulously accurate, and devoid of all opinions, inferences, and
argumentation, the appellate advocate should study the opponent's
statement and note where facts seem colored, because coloration inva-
riably indicates the other side's weak points.20 Unfortunately, an
equally abbreviated discussion of legal memoranda-a subject of im-
portance to law students and to young lawyers--has little to offer.21
In chapter six, Professor Gopen reminds us that the first step in
every form of legal writing is to "Know your reader."22 Good writing,
he correctly observes, calls not only for sound logic, completeness, clar-
ity of expression, and consistency, but also for sensitivity to the audi-
ence, including use of the appropriate tone. As Professor Gopen notes,
many otherwise careful writers recognize the need for the first four
qualities, yet fail to communicate their ideas effectively because they
write above or below the reader's level of comprehension. 23 The chap-
ter gives meaning to this advice in a unique way-by teaching how to
write effective instructions, a task lawyers are often called on to
perform.
IV. ARGUMENTS OR CONCLUSIONS?
Legal argumentation, like other forms of logic, requires the writer
to articulate each argument that leads to the conclusion. In his early
pages, Professor Gopen reminds advocates to avoid the common pitfall
of becoming so convinced by their own position that they forget to put
all the supporting arguments on paper.24 Unlike many other writers,
advocates cannot rely on the audience---the court or an adversary-to
supply a missing argument. If the brief is missing an argument, the
advocate may lose both the reader and the case.
In chapter eight, Professor Gopen moves one step further and dis-
cusses an important skill that our own experience pinpoints as a major
problem for most law students: how to recognize the difference be-
19. Id. 111.
20. Id.
21. Id. 119-21.
22. Id. 121-22.
23. Id. 127.
24. Id. 6-7.
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tween an argument and a conclusion. 25 We have found that many stu-
dents, though mindful of the need to support each conclusion with all
necessary arguments, nonetheless fail to do so. Instead, they often sup-
port their conclusion with other conclusions.
Professor Gopen offers some useful tests to enable an advocate to
determine whether a sentence contains an argument or a conclusion.
One test is to consider the sentence and keep asking "Why?" until that
question has been answered.26 For example, even to the experienced
ear, a forceful statement such as this one smacks of argumentation:
Alabama's death penalty statute violates the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause of the eighth amendment and the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment because it precludes lesser included of-
fense verdicts.
But Professor Gopen explains that this type of sentence does not offer
an argument "why" Alabama's statutory preclusion of lesser included
offense verdicts should be held unconstitutional. It is no more than a
sheep in wolf's clothing-a conclusion that sounds like forceful argu-
mentation but offers little or no support for the intended proposition.
As many advocates can painfully testify, conclusory statements like this
one, unsupported by thorough argumentation, fall like a house of cards
during oral argument the first time a judge disputes the assertions. In
this uncomfortable moment, the advocate has no choice but to think
quickly and articulate all the arguments that should have been in the
brief.
A second test to distinguish an argument from a conclusion is to
juxtapose the sentence with its negative.2 7 The more sense that can be
made of the negative, the more conclusory is the original:
Original -Alabama's death penalty statute violates the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause it precludes lesser included offense verdicts.
Negative-Alabama's death penalty statute does not violate the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because it precludes lesser included offense verdicts.
In contrast, when the sentence contains an argument rather than a
conclusion, as in the successful petitioner's brief in Beck v. Alabama,28
juxtaposition produces an illogical statement:
Original -Alabama's death penalty statute violates the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment and
25. Id. 183-89.
26. Id. 185.
27. Id. 185-86.
28. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause the preclusion of lesser included offense verdicts
substantially increases the risk of error in the factfinding
process.
29
Negative-Alabama's death penalty statute does not violate the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because the preclusion of lesser included offense verdicts
substantially increases the risk of error in the factfinding
process.
V. A SYSTEM FOR SELF-REVISION: THE PROBLEM OF
THE WEAK MAIN VERB
The backbone of Professor Gopen's book is his "System for Self-
Revision," which he presents in chapter two. Because revising follows
writing, we have saved our discussion of this system for last.
Revising one's own work is as important as it is difficult. Even
accomplished lawyers rarely write precise and felicitous first drafts.
Self-revision is also a sometimes frustrating and, according to Professor
Gopen, ultimately futile exercise. The more we reread our own words,
he observes, the more our mind robs us of the ability to view them with
objectivity and editorial detachment. To make this depressing point,
Professor Gopen describes with uncanny accuracy the mental processes
that each of us will recognize:
[The writer] looks at the words; he recalls their individual denota-
tions and connotations; he understands the significance of the syntax;
and synthesizing all of this he perceives a meaning for the whole
sentence. If that meaning corresponds to his intended meaning (and
it usually does), he proceeds to the next sentence. Actually, however,
the following happens: he recognizes the words and the order they
are in; he remembers what he was thinking when he put those words
in that order. Since this has brought to mind for him his intended
meaning, he believes it will do the same for his reader and therefore
proceeds to the next sentence. Mere association, and not objective
perception, has produced the desired self-satisfaction.30
One cure for this lack of objectivity is, of course, the disinterested
reader. Any experienced lawyer will ask others to read and criticize
drafts of an important document or brief. The wise judge, too, makes it
a practice to have a law clerk scrutinize and dissect all opinions before
they leave the chambers. Yet we all know that the day-to-day pressures
of law practice often make scrutiny by a second set of eyes an unafford-
able luxury.
29. Id. at 632.
30. G. GOPEN, supra note 8, at 18.
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Professor Gopen believes he has found a reliable "danger signal"
to help the writer objectively edit his work. Of all the characteristics
that indicate ineffective writing, he singles out for discussion what he
calls the "weak main verb."' 31 The stronger a sentence's main verb is, he
tells us, the more effective the sentence will be; effective sentences in
turn produce effective paragraphs and effective writing.
No verb is intrinsically weak or strong.32 A "weak main verb" is
one whose meaning bears little or no relation to the meaning of the
sentence. A "strong verb," on the other hand, is one whose meaning
bears a direct relation to the meaning of the sentence. The verb "to be"
("am," "are," "is," and so forth), which is used as a weak verb more
often than any other verb, illustrates the difference:33
This sentence is a good example of the point I am trying to make.
The main verb--"is"-is weak because it bears no relation to the
writer's meaning. "Example" is the most important word in the sen-
tence, so its verb form serves as a strong verb:
This sentence exemplifies my point well.
Stressing the main verb, Professor Gopen presents a system for
writers to employ to edit their own writing. He acknowledges that this
system for self-revision is "sophisticated and difficult to use. . . [and]
require[s] a substantially strenuous effort,"'34 an admission his six-page
excursion into algebraic, geometric, and Latin illustrations does noth-
ing to belie. He says, however, that after working through the system
in detail only a few times, the writer will begin to construct more rigor-
ous sentences and paragraphs without further need to resort to it. The
burdensome nature of this complex six-step system is evident from its
mere recitation:
Step I
Circle the main verb(s) in each clause of each sentence, being careful
to treat all passive constructions as the verb "to be." If you cannot
deduce the general topic of the paragraph from reading only the cir-
cled words, then you have too many weak verbs and should continue
to Step 2. Step 2
Considering only the first sentence, decide if the main verb(s) com-
municates the central idea. If it does not, decide what the most im-
portant content of the sentence is and find a verb that capsulizes that
idea. Then restructure a sentence around the new main verb, being
31. Id. 19.
32. Id.
33. Professor Cooper's title for chapter one of WRITING IN LAW PRACTICE-Law is Lan.
guage-illustrates a strong use of the verb "to be." Professor Cooper uses "is" to mean "equals,"
which goes right to the heart of the sentence's meaning. F. COOPER, WRITING IN LAW PRACTICE I
(1963).
34. G. GOPEN, suzpra note 8, at 19.
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extremely careful to include everything from your original sentence
and to add nothing that is new (at this point). [Often in the restruc-
turing of a sentence some element of the original will not fit the new
schema. If this happens, note the word or words in the margin so
you can return to them later.]
Step 3
Repeat Step 2 for each sentence in the paragraph, being careful to
treat each one in isolation. The more completely you can disregard
all other sentences while working on one, the better your final result
will be.
Step 4
Now reread your new sentences as a new paragraph and take note of
the large number of repetitions that have surfaced. (Your main verbs
will repeat, as well as your subjects, in most cases.) Then combine
sentences to eliminate as many of the repeats as you can. During this
process you should attempt to add in all the words you relegated to
the margins earlier. You will find yourself reordering thoughts and
articulating connections you had previously omitted, thus filling in
the "gap between the period that ends one sentence and the capital
letter that begins the next."
Step 5
If the process of collapsing redundancies leaves your sentences with
seemingly less of your thought tha[n] you felt you were trying to ex-
press before, search your prose throughout these drafts for patterns
that might have been forming. For example, check all the subjects of
the sentences. Do they form a pattern or progression? Do the same
for the verbs, the objects, and the modifiers. Have you included a
large number of abstract nouns, or of any other recognizable cate-
gory of words? Are they in a pattern?...
Step 6
Polish the prose so that it fulfills grammatical requirements and pro-
ceeds as smoothly, directly, and forcefully as possible.35
We are not convinced that Professor Gopen's concededly complex
system for self-revision is a panacea for the struggling writer. Although
his goal-to help the writer achieve greater clarity and precision-is
laudable, it can be achieved more efficiently and more effectively
through guidelines that are not so "sophisticated and difficult to use"
that they "require a substantially strenuous effort" from the writer.36
Even if the writer is patient enough to use the time-consuming system,
he is likely to use it only once or twice before collapsing from the
mental exertion and returning to writing as usual, retaining only the
speculative residual benefits that come from making the initial mental
sacrifice. 37
35. Id. 31-34.
36. Id. 19.
37. In his review of How To WRITE PLAIN ENoGLISH, Professor Wydick questions whether
Dr. Flesch's controversial "readability formula" (which requires a writer, among other things, to
count words, syllables, and sentences and to do long division) is useful "in the day-to-day writing
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Less complex rules are available. With considerably less strain,
for example, the writer can achieve clarity and precision by adhering to
the six principles that Professor Richard C. Wydick sets forth in Plain
English for Lawyers. (1) omit surplus words; (2) use familiar, concrete
words; (3) use short sentences; (4) use base verbs and the active voice;
(5) arrange your words with care; and (6) avoid language quirks.38 The
writer is likely to keep Professor Wydick's practical guidelines in mind
each time he revises; on the other hand, he is likely to discard Professor
Gopen's convoluted system at the first opportunity.
Still, when Professor Gopen's unique system for self-revision is
distilled to its essence-sensitivity to the problem of the weak main
verb-it makes an original contribution to the literature by providing
another useful "danger signal" to the careful writer. Because there is
more to good writing than using strong main verbs, however, Professor
Gopen's narrowly focused system cannot bear the entire editorial
burden.
CONCLUSION
Amidst the widespread criticism of legal writing, any book that
contributes to improved written expression is likely to receive a warm
welcome. This conclusion certainly applies to Professor Gopen's Writ-
ing From a Legal Perspective, to which we extend a warm, but not un-
critical, welcome. The lawyer or law student who studies this volume
will emerge a better writer for the effort.
done by busy practicing lawyers." Wydick, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REv. 711, 716 (1980). In
his preface to Dr. Flesch's book, however, Michael Pertschuk, former Federal Trade Commission
Chairman, attests to the usefulness of Dr. Flesch's formula-a kind of Skinnerian word monitor-
ing for writers-in banishing gobbledygook from legislation, administrative regulations, and con-
sumer contracts. Flesch, How TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH xi (1979).
38. R. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 65 (1979).
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